

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS FOR
THE WAR ON TERRORISM, COUNTERING
MIDDLE-EASTERN ANTI-AMERICAN BIAS

by

Captain Paul Gallagher
United States Navy

Colonel David J. Smith
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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Despite the growth of media outlets in the Middle East, inarguably the understanding of US strategic vision and intent is commonly misunderstood and/or misconstrued. In fact, an active mis-information campaign is commonly practiced by media throughout the region. The loss to the US in "soft power" and influence has been incalculable and must be reversed. My intent in this document is to analyze the makeup of the average man on "the Arab Street", utilize the information the analysis provides, and devise a strategy to combat the propaganda and mis-information he has been exposed to throughout his life. Based on those findings I will develop proposals that utilize all aspect of America's national power to include initiatives in both the public and private sectors.

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STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE WAR ON TERRORISM, COUNTERING MIDDLE-EASTERN ANTI-AMERICAN BIAS

Following the attacks on the United States of September 2001, favorable world opinion and sympathy for the United States was at an unprecedented level. However, in the subsequent four years support for America in its prosecution of its global war has declined precipitously. Without exception, countries from Canada to Egypt have strong disagreement over how the United States has pursued its war aims despite the fact that it is the world's greatest advocate of human rights, and epitomizes the shared values of many of the people of the world including those in the Arab countries. This unfavorable perception has serious repercussions in the United States ability to influence events and attract coalition partners for the hard work ahead. Yet despite the overwhelmingly negative opinion polls, there remains a favorable opinion of American cultural values and the American people worldwide. The disparity on this critical National Security issue is extremely damaging to the Nation's global campaign. However, polling results from the Middle East suggest that the failure is, in fact, a result of America losing the information campaign and that the potential exists to change opinions to establish positive conditions for long term peace.

In order to enhance trust in this region and to begin to change deeply held animosities, this paper will assess who the generic Arab/Middle Easterner actually is, from his family through his educational and cultural experiences. Once a profile has been developed, strategies will be discussed which hold the promise of influencing public opinion in the region. Additionally, the psychology of learning and emotional inculcation will be evaluated with a view toward how America's national talents can be brought to bear in order to influence people of the region toward a more moderate perspective on US policy. Finally, several recommendations will be presented to form the basis for an offensive information operations campaign designed to build better understanding and support for US policies with the Muslim world.

U.S. – ARAB RELATIONS

Over the course of the past thirty years, with the notable exception of U.S. support to Israel, arguably the policies of the United States have been very accommodating to people of Muslim faith. However, somehow in framing the issues much of what has transpired has been viewed as negative by the Muslim world. A short summary of significant American actions follows:

In the 1976 Presidential campaign, candidate Jimmy Carter criticized Iran's human rights record and in his inaugural speech put that issue at the forefront of his foreign policy agenda.

Exceptionally sensitive toward the West's attitudes, particularly America's, the shah set about immediately to loosen his repression.¹ These initial actions facilitated further unrest and the Shah's hesitancy to respond with characteristic repression eventually resulted in his fall from power. The ensuing U.S. hands off approach following his departure set up conditions for the dissolution of the Iranian Army and Police forces leaving a power vacuum in Iran which was quickly filled by a small minority whose spiritual leader was the Ayatollah Khomeini.²

Other notable pro Muslim American policies on the diplomatic front include:

- Brokering of the Camp David accords and subsequent elevation of Egypt to the number two recipient of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funding (non military) which since 1976 is in excess of \$25 Billion.³ In military aid for 2005 alone the US will provide \$1.3B.⁴
- Historic friendship to Turkey has run the gamut from financial and military assistance to political support on issues critical to Turkish fiscal and national security.

American Military actions that have been clearly supportive of specific Muslim causes include:

- The United States support for the Afghan Mujahadeen resistance to the Soviet incursion in the 1970's and 80's was instrumental to the Afghan success.
- The United States resolute action on behalf of the small Arab country of Kuwait in response to an Iraqi invasion culminated in operation Desert Storm.
- Direct forceful American action to avert Muslim genocide in the Balkan states of Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo.
- Removal of the repressive Taliban regime of Afghanistan from power.
- The toppling of Saddam Hussein, one of the most repressive tyrants in history which set the stage for the recent elections and the ongoing development of representative government.

Economically USAID funding levels to the Middle Eastern region have been very generous:

- Jordan has seen significant increases in USAID in recent years currently making them the number three recipient of American assistance worldwide.
- As indicated above Egypt is the number two recipient of aid worldwide, and US support to Turkey has been amongst America's highest priorities.

Viewed from the perspective of the DIME model the United States has focused exclusively on the diplomatic, military and economic elements of national power. Notable in its absence are any significant informational policies which could better frame America's overall approach to people of Muslim faith worldwide. As a result of this failure, the world has gained its perceptions of US actions from other than American spokespersons, and the outcome has been decidedly negative, underscored by recent polling in Egypt that reveals a 98% unfavorable view of America.⁵

WHAT ARABS BELIEVE

When asked what matters most to Arabs they identify matters of personal security, fulfillment, the quality and security of their daily work, their faith, and their family. In other words, like people everywhere, Arabs want to be secure, healthy, and prosperous. In politics, civil and personal rights were consistently noted as the most important issues followed by health care, but placed above their personal economic situation, and concern over moral standards were political concerns of Palestine and the rights of the Palestinian people. The situation of the Palestinians appears to have become a personal matter.

The Arab world is, by and large, a region in the midst of a great transition. During this last century, the region was conditioned and shaped by the impact of the two world wars and a host of regional conflicts. Imperialism and colonialism distorted development of the region. The very geopolitical map of the entire area was drawn up based on the territorial claims of imperial occupiers who, when they withdrew, left in their wake national entities which in reality had no true national identity. This fact explains why people in the Middle East identify themselves first and foremost as "being Arab", followed by their religion and finally their nationality respectively. Being identified by country is a priority choice only among the Lebanese. Religion as the principle source of identification is only significant in Morocco and among Arabs in Israel.

Arabs, not surprisingly, view other countries in terms of the policies they pursue vis-à-vis the Arab world. Arabs, therefore, hold an extremely negative view of Israel and similarly hold quite unfavorable views of the United States and the United Kingdom. But before one concludes that this is the result of a general anti-Western mindset, it is important to note that Arabs have positive attitudes towards France, Canada, Germany and Japan. Of particular note, although Arabs who were recently polled had strong favorable attitudes toward American "Science and Technology," "Freedom and Democracy," "Education," "Movies and Television," and even largely favorable attitudes toward the American people, they had extremely negative attitudes toward U.S. policy in the Arab world, Iraq, and most especially towards Palestine."⁶

In the Middle East individual status is a birthright. It is commonly accepted that Allah directs the status that individuals will have throughout life, and once you are born into status, one must protect it from all challengers for the rest of your life. If you fail, and are successfully criticized in public or insulted, you lose some status, and your family also loses. Clearly, the protection of status is a full time occupation for many Arabs. When an outsider directly criticizes an Arab, even when relying on facts to evaluate performance, or troubleshoot a process, the Arab must above all else protect himself and his status. As a result, an Arab can very easily dismiss objective facts. To him "facts" are what you see, what you experience, what you "want to see". Therefore, if they are presented with failure and potential criticism, they simply re-interpret the facts to suit their needs

Shame is another important aspect of the Arab mind which needs to be understood. In a psychological sense it is the "drive" to prevent or quickly escape negative judgments by others. The perception of shame is so abhorrent that many Arabs will deny the truth, to preserve face. Most importantly, any threat to the Arab sense of honor and dignity can lead to prolonged animosity.⁷

EDUCATION

There are different educational circumstances in each of the countries of the region; however, the overall picture is decidedly negative. There are approximately seventy million illiterate individuals over the age of fifteen, most of whom are female. About fifteen million school age children are not enrolled at school at all. Enrollment at the secondary level has increased, but is still less than 60% with a very high dropout rate.

Despite a regional commitment to expansion of basic education, achievement levels have remained low. Textbooks and teaching methods are for the most part outdated and do not adequately prepare the student for the technology dependent world the student will face in the future. Teaching in the Arab world is often hampered by low teacher morale, low salaries, and indifferent quality of teacher training. There is generally a lack of respect for intellectual development coupled with insufficient rewards. Teachers who themselves have not been exposed to effective teaching strategies and are unaware of different modes of learning, different motivational techniques, multiple student needs, and various levels of intelligence, as well as various assessment regimes, cannot implement effective change. The promotion of new educational ideas such as student centered learning, interactive classrooms, and critical thinking will not amount to much until this cornerstone of the system is improved.

There are no academic plans or goals which are aligned with the individual or social needs of the culture or with the demands of the labor market. Courses are repeated year after year without review, revision or evaluation. In public schools subject matter has little relevance to the real world. At the vocational training level the systems lack a national strategy compatible with the labor market which often means the schools will produce workers with no jobs to fill. Across the spectrum of the region absent from curricula are issues such as citizenship, environmental and human rights education.

Classroom lecturing by teachers and rote memorization of facts and ideas by students remains the dominant teaching style in the region. In some poorer countries Muslim fundamentalist schools called Madrasas, which are commonly funded by Saudi Arabia, teach nothing but rote memorization and unquestioning obedience to the Koran.⁸

This methodology is an area of concern for western education experts who overwhelmingly concur that by not utilizing the interactive question and answer method dominant in the west that Arab schools are putting their youth at a disadvantage. The memorization learning methods commonly utilized inhibit critical thought and the development of problem solving skills needed for societal growth. Policy experts believe that reforming primary and secondary education is central to the future of democracy in the region, the groundwork for democratic political reform may only be established when the teaching methods and curriculum common to the region's schools are changed.⁹

At the more rudimentary level, the outcomes produced by these dysfunctional systems fuel the sense of hopelessness, despair and seething anger common to the disaffected Arab youth of today. Caught in the endless cycle of failed educational systems and the inevitable economic impacts he takes his training into a world that offers little potential for employment or advancement.

SOCIAL INCULCATION

Throughout the developed world the family and the educational system of each society are commonly the greatest factor in "socializing" the individual. However, in view of the ongoing failure of the Middle Eastern educational systems to provide meaningful educations and develop problem solving skills in its students, it is important to assess the actual means through which the Middle Easterner gains his "knowledge" of the world. Quite naturally since most individuals spend minimal time in a school environment, their "educations" take place within the popular culture. For the purpose of this discussion regarding US public diplomacy it is important to understand the nature of that education as well.

There is a common tendency among people of every culture towards "stereotyping". Although present in many types of thinking, it is especially common in popular thought, and is particularly strong among the less educated. Inarguably the Middle Easterner's stereotype of the United States is decidedly negative, viewing the typical American as anti-Muslim, warlike, and covetous of the world's natural resources. To the average Middle Easterner these stereotypes are so psychologically real that they have developed into rigid preconceptions or patterns of perception. The stereotypes are conventional labels which consist of words, phrases, symbols and images. And these preconceptions, unless education has made one acutely aware, deeply govern the whole process of perception. True statements about complicated issues or about groups of people or races or nationalities, organizations or social classes cannot be summed up in a few words or simple pictures. Stereotypes about nationalities, cultures, or ethnicities distort the objective reality as it is perceived in the mind. The stereotypes also motivate behavior toward the proponents of these views and towards groups and classes. They may be distortions of objective truth, but they are psychological realities.¹⁰

MIDDLE EASTERN MEDIA

Until recently there has been no independent regional news network in the Arab world. Up until the 1990's almost all Arab media was state controlled or somehow closely affiliated with their governments. Following the lead of the Soviet Union, repressive Arab governments have utilized their media to create bogey men or scapegoats to explain economic and societal failures and to justify the need for repressive security apparatus and limitations of basic rights.

A case in point is America's foremost ally in the region, Egypt which is considered to have one of the most moderate governments in the Middle East. The extensive state controlled media is routinely utilized to obfuscate the realities of Egyptian life. Despite being the second largest recipient of USAID, the Egyptian economy is a basket case, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of \$1,221 per person. The Mubarek government has persistently clung to power in large part by blaming the United States and Israel for its country's problems. Incendiary articles such as the assertion that the attacks of September 11, 2001 were hatched by Jews to maneuver America into a general war against Muslims, testify to the lengths the government is willing to go to distract their public's attention from reality.

The recent introduction of Al Jazeera has changed the landscape in the region. Although it has quickly established a bad reputation in America for its apparent avocation on behalf of radical Muslim causes and anti U.S. propagandizing, Al Jazeera represents the first media

outlet in the Arab world that allows relatively uncensored reporting. Americans should not feel singled out by the negative Al Jazeera reporting, it's scathing criticisms of Arab governments including the late Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization has garnered significant protests from almost all of the regions governments.

Al Jazeera is the only 24 hour news network in the Arab world. In addition to its fast moving, video heavy newscasts, it has built an audience through its talk shows which probe political, social, and religious issues previously untouched by Arab media.¹¹ Al Jazeera, despite western perception, does report unedited news and has provided opportunities for U.S. spokespeople to appear on their interview shows uncensored. (To date, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleeza Rice, Colin Powell and the Ambassador to Lebanon have appeared). Beyond Al Jazeera there is now a small sampling of independent media outlets in the region who are purveyors of independent news, but far more common are the official and quasi official newspapers and television stations. In either case, (official or quasi official) one should expect nothing more from them than pro-regime/government stories, and incendiary columns in regard to Israel and the United States.

"During the recent Iraq War, for the first time, Arab media carried the war uncensored to the people, and concurrently took itself to a new place which holds the possibility for critical reporting and free thinking. Regrettably, the concern now is that the Arab press may have had its shining moment and has slipped back to the days of intimidated journalists and government propaganda."¹²

Recently the United States has begun broadcasting to the Middle East through the Voice of America, and Radio Sawa. These radio networks have established relative popularity because of the quality of the programming and music, however, it is no secret that they are American networks which makes their news and commentary not credible to a cynical Muslim audience.

POSTULATE REGARDING THE MAN ON THE ARAB STREET

The foregoing has been an attempt to pool critical societal elements in the search to identify America's target audience, the generic Arab man on the street. What emerges is a person who views himself above all else as "Arab". He is exceptionally sensitive to criticism and spends an inordinate amount of time and energy protecting his status, often times to both his and his culture's detriment. He shares the same intrinsic values as the average American. He is generally unsophisticated regarding the world outside the Middle East or even his own local community. His world view is principally shaped by the status of his birth, rote memorization of

Arab history, the Koran, cultural stereotypes, and government controlled media. Although he express's cynicism for his local media, to a large extent he has inculcated it. He is either a relatively malleable individual or, as a result of the centuries of oppressive Ottoman occupation and Arab government oppression, one who simply practice a form of detachment/escapism which causes him to not challenge what he is presented. As a result of the loosening of media restrictions during the war alluded to above, his world view has been shaken up and his frustration and soul searching has reached new heights. The overwhelming popularity and exponential growth of Al Jazeera which, although it often offends, enrages, and alienates it's viewers, is illustrative of his newfound thirst for truth and additionally has forced the people of the region to confront the idea that they have been living in a make believe world.

DYNAMICS OF LEARNING

To overcome a lifetime of propaganda and cultural bias is an extremely tall order, but if the United States is to have any hope of success it must bring all it's national power to the fight to include it's knowledge of social science and some of the techniques utilized in private sector marketing.

American corporations have sponsored extensive research on how to influence human behavior for the purpose of selling things. Many of the concepts utilized in this field are extremely relevant to a strategic communications campaign. These concepts are founded on a basic understanding of how the brain actually works.

The human brain, consists of two large, multi-convoluted lobes beneath the top of the skull, which makes man unique over all the other species. Generally speaking, reasoning, logic, language, and other intellectual activities take place on the left side of the brain. The left brain processes rational and logical information, for the most part, information that is processed by the left brain accesses short term memory.

The right side of the brain is believed to be more involved in processing emotion, feeling, creativity, and intuition. Although not everyone is artistic, almost all people have an appreciation of, or are able to acknowledge music and art. These activities are processed by the right brain. Hence, an advertisement that is set to music or rhyme will have a better opportunity of penetrating the right brain because of the emotional aspects of music. Print messages that feature eye catching artwork have the same effect. Scientists and researchers are currently researching short and long term memory, and although they have not conclusively determined the site of long term memory, they feel strongly that it is accessed through the right side of the brain, since the right brain processes emotion, which is long term. Organizations conducting

Strategic Communications need to have an understanding of the right brain because of its association with emotional activity, long term memory, and motivation. Emotions, in this clinical definition, are tied to motivation, and the primary purpose of information operations is to motivate a person to do or think something.

THREE DIMENSIONS OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Logic/rationalization is the first dimension of information and the one that is most familiar and most exploited. Most communicative initiatives are simple efforts to get out information through speeches and press conferences in which logical questions are asked and answered. Hence, listeners to the information respond accordingly, with logic and the left side of their brain. Since humans want to appear logical and rational, they give logical and rational responses to the information presented that are known as rationalizations. They may be true or untrue, but they represent what the individual wants to believe. Rationalizations can influence the emotions since they are obvious, powerful, and they can be motivating. The problem with rationalization is that at some point the person has to deal with emotion, and people's decisions are based primarily on emotion.¹³

The second element of influencing people through communication is memory. How does the message become memorable?

"Suggestions" are one of the most effective ways. They are brief (three to five words) declaratory statements, worded in a positive direction. They do not have to be logical or based on fact. They are simple statements which do not process logical and rational thinking. Suggestions should not be worded negatively because the unconscious mind is unable to process reverse logic. For example, "don't do drugs" requires the mind to process a proposition. The unconscious/right brain does not process information, it absorbs messages and images.

The third and most critical dimension of influence is emotion. Individuals cannot tell you about their own motivation; it is the most puzzling subject in human behavior. Why do people smoke, or commit crimes when they know they will be punished, conversely, why do people succeed, become great leaders, or dedicate their lives unselfishly to others?

In clinical setting psychologists have discovered how to access hidden motivators from the silent (right) side of the brain through a technique known as visualization. Instead of trying to describe what they think happened, or what they remember, the subject simply describes what they see. This method is particularly effective when being used for the recovery of evidence at

a crime scene or in situations where memory must be accessed, and it is routinely exploited as an essential ingredient in commercial marketing, and in propaganda.

This communication to the mind approach is different because it deals with the actual causes and motives that drive individuals to do what they do, and to the choices they make. Behavioral scientists have not been all that helpful as compared to creative directors who have taken their own approach and have been more on target than anyone else. What communicating to the mind offers is a system, a methodology, and strategy that puts the information provider and creative director in a symbiotic relationship aiming at motivation and emotion.¹⁴

FOCUSING AMERICAS UNTAPPED CAPABILITIES

The U.S. Government under utilizes the vast resources and talents of the private sector, lagging far behind in most of the areas required for effective Strategic Communications such as technology, film and broadcast experience, marketing research, and communications expertise. These are the critical elements in America's attempt to reach the emotional and motivational realms of the right brain of the target audience. The advantages for the private sector in this area are vast since they are not encumbered by the protocols and restrictions which are inherent in inter-governmental relationships. For example, target audiences of the U.S. Government tend to be the foreign Government itself, vice the people of that nation. The requirement to observe diplomatic protocols often obscures the communication and allows the local government to "spin" the message and tailor it for their own purpose. Moreover, formal government communications tend to be rigid and have carefully parsed wording for political and legal reasons. They are too often communicated in a push down style that does not take into account the perspective of the audience or open the floor for dialogue or debate. As a result, the U.S. government is seen as defining its interests, while failing to listen to the target international audience.

The private sector brings cutting edge forms of media, technology and marketing skills that are not available to the government. Entertainment celebrities and media spokespeople are far more likely to cooperate and even actively support an organization they view as independent of the government's policies. Outside Non-Governmental Organizations would be likely to participate in legitimate non-US government efforts and could provide credible, independent messengers from many sectors of American life, including Arab and Muslim Americans. The recent Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Affairs recommended creation of an independent, not for profit "Corporation for Public Diplomacy"

(CPD). Modeled on the highly respected Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), it could serve as the focal point for private sector involvement in public diplomacy.

The CPB is a corporation with tax exempt status. It is eligible to receive private sector grants which historically have been substantial. The CPB has been instrumental in the establishment of support for a variety of programs to include Sesame Street, The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, Bill Moyer's documentaries, and Frontline. Of highest significance, the subjects and perspectives of the programs produced, as often as not, had viewpoints contrary to current administration policy. The CPB and inferentially the government which provides \$350 million of public money are not seen as directly responsible for the programming on CPB stations. In a similar construct an organization like a "Corporation for Public Diplomacy" would likewise seek to leverage private sector creativity and flexibility. It could attract media and personalities who are less willing to work directly with US governmental agencies. Its proposed structure also would take advantage of the fact that private media often communicate American values, religious commitments, and the merits of freedom and democracy. Unlike official channels, the CPD could support regional voices of moderation and independent media. Expansion of the range of America's messengers abroad could include locals such as young and moderate Arabs and Muslims, mullahs, journalists, and talk show personalities who can criticize flaws within their own regions far more credibly than a US diplomat ever could. The United States could also use independent non-traditional messengers to highlight the diversity of American life to include:

- Arab-American firefighters and Police Officers who rushed to the World Trade Center scene on September 11.
- Arab and Muslim Americans, including women and children who died or lost loved ones on September 11.
- Muslim Americans including sports stars and other celebrities who are thriving in America and can attest to the respect their religion receives.
- Finally, and perhaps most credible, are Muslims from regions where America has used its power and influence to restore peace, and establish environments where Human Rights are respected: Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and now Iraq where the recent elections can be utilized to vindicate US policy in that country.

Current trends in information technology are transforming how the world communicates and learns. Looking forward, leaders in the Strategic Communications campaign need to understand and focus on the Internet revolution and how it is fundamentally changing the relationship between information content and communications channels. This is particularly true

in countries with state controlled media where the Internet can be the only source of free information. It is worth noting that the terrorists who engineered the 9/11 attacks were mostly middle class individuals who one would assume had the wherewithal to utilize personal computers and access the internet. Clearly the internet is the emerging way ahead, and the United States Strategic Communications campaign needs to give high priority to the latest technologies to include content rich, language specific Internet services.¹⁵

INFORMATION OPERATIONS OFFENSIVE GAMEPLAN

The Arab/Muslim culture is at a crossroads and is unsure of the way ahead. In the reporting of the war in Iraq, the Iraqi government's pronouncements about glorious victories while American forces were just miles away revealed the sham of Middle Eastern news reporting and caused the people of the region to quietly question its assumptions as never before. More recently the elections in Iraq demonstrated to the region that America is in fact living up to its word and is not in the business of creating an empire.

The goals of the United States Strategic Information Campaign should be to demonstrate to the world that the United States is a benign even handed broker; that American policies are justified, motivated by a determination for security at home, and the belief that legitimate representative governments will act peacefully; that Americans are a tolerant peace loving people who do not seek empire or the elimination of any differing religious beliefs. Now more than ever it is critical that America elevate its Strategic Communications Campaign to the highest priority, utilizing all of its talents and capabilities to capture the momentum of recent events and achieve these exceedingly worthwhile goals.

There are four areas in which the United States should aggressively move forward to accomplish this mission:

CONTINUE TO FUND BROADCASTING LIKE VOICE OF AMERICA, AND RADIO SAWA.

These networks are popular with the youthful population throughout the Middle East because their entertainment appeals to the tastes of younger Arabs. Although Middle Easterners have been dismissive of the news and commentary from American radio networks, they familiarize America to their audience and therefore they remain as one of the foundational bridges by which the United States communicates with the people of the region.

EXPLOIT THE REGIONAL ORGANIC NETWORKS.

Since U.S. government sponsored media in the region is in its infancy and its news and commentary will be viewed with skepticism by the Arab audience, the US first tack should be

utilization of organic networks. Going forward, the United States should exert as much influence as practicable on the Emiri and the management of Al Jazeera to provide American spokespersons uncensored air time, particularly in response to critical breaking news. Additionally the US Department of Defense should provide opportunities for Al Jazeera and other regional networks to embed television reporters with troops in Iraq or any future regional conflict (subject to similar requirements which apply to U.S. media) in order to have the coalitions side of the story from its own front lines related to the public in the all important visual realm of the media.

Worldwide, American Ambassadors need to become far more involved in Strategic Communications in whichever countries they are assigned. Professional and social interaction with news editors and other people of influence should be emphasized, and educational exchange programs should be re-vitalized. Finally, countries with controlled media who are willfully misrepresenting facts and issues to cultivate anti-American sentiment should be threatened with loss of USAID and other economic or diplomatic sanctions.

EMPOWER THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE CORPORATION FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CONCEPT.

The US Government is constrained by protocol and inadequately equipped to take advantage of the tools and techniques which comprise truly effective strategic communications. However, the audience in the Middle East remains deeply cynical of the US Government as a truthful messenger. The private sector brings a capability to introduce credible spokespeople from all walks of life who will tell a story in a way for the audience to identify with. A Muslim from Kosovo describing how America saved him from genocide; an Afghani who fought side by side with Americans against an evil unjust regime; Muslims who have been abused by their own Muslim governments like the Kurds of Iraq all have tremendous credibility to a Muslim audience. These people will have an impact with the audience beyond anything the US government might say or do, and the private sectors ability to dramatize these people and events will likely have profound implications.

UTILIZE KNOWLEDGE OF HUMAN EMOTION AND MOTIVATION TO IMPART INFORMATION.

Studies of the methodology of how opinions form have determined that although direct communications like editorials and political dialogue do influence people, the most effective means of inculcating opinion is through literature or entertaining media presentations, i.e. storytelling, and art.¹⁶ This is particularly true in the Middle East where we have described the

audience as being made up of individuals who are averse to criticism and will bend facts and logic to save face. Appeals to logic from a talking head on television will not change minds. The message America ultimately must convey needs to access the right brain; hence the medium in which it is delivered is critical. In the national experience of Americans this phenomenon has been seen in several instances; most notable was Harriet Beecher Stowe's "Uncle Toms Cabin" which in the mid nineteenth century galvanized northern public opinion over the slavery issue. In the twentieth century there have been several books and films which have led to societal change including, "To Kill a Mockingbird", that opened peoples eyes to evils of racism, and helped to facilitate the civil rights movement, "On the Waterfront", and "Blackboard Jungle" which provoked societal shifts and led to reform.

Given that the US can expect at best only gradual influence from its broadcast news to the region, and the fact that American movies and television programming are extremely popular, it is clear that the best chance of gaining influence is by building bridges between American society and others using common cultural pursuits in every genre of art music, theater, and academia. This long term effort will be a way to open dialogue with key foreign publics, as well as personal and institutional relationships founded on shared ideas and values, such as student and professional exchanges, art exhibits, American libraries abroad, and academic endowments. Some of these programs should be administered through US embassies, but again, to be truly effective the US should look to the private sector, NGO's, and academic institutions. The United States Government needs to make every effort to convince its film, television, and artistic community to support this crucial effort and craft stories and art which very subtly portray America, its people and values in a positive manner which emphasize commonality with Arab peoples.

CONCLUSION

The military campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq have been fought and won. The President has expressed determination to stabilize those countries in the face of insurgency and it should reasonably be anticipated that there will be a gradual reduction in violence as the United States and its coalition partners eventually eradicate the insurgents. Clearly the bigger struggle remaining is to diffuse the aberrant conditions which have led to the clash of cultures. That struggle will not be won on the battlefield, it will not be won in a few years time, but it may be accomplished if America can master this sphere of influence by rigorously applying the strong cultural assets of creativity, and determination blended with a new one, *patience*.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Dariush Zahedi, *The Iranian Revolution Then and Now: Indicators of Regime Instability* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 169. "The fuse that detonated the explosives of the revolution was lit by the shah's ambivalent and partial policy of liberalization which he initiated in 1977 primarily to placate the newly installed Carter administration."

² Marie Allen, "Zbigniew Brzezinski Exit Interview," 20 February 2004; available from <<http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov>>; Internet; accessed 27 September 2004. A heated debate between the Carter Administration National Security Adviser and the State Department was engaged in with the President ultimately deciding to allow events to take their own course.

³ USAID Egypt, "Overview," 29 September 2004; available from <<http://www.usaid-eg.org>>; Internet; accessed 30 September 2004. 7.07 billion for commodity imports, including equipment and materials for industry and development; \$6.03 billion for physical infrastructure, including water, wastewater, sanitation, electric power, telecommunications, transportation, and industry; \$4.86 billion for basic services, including health, family planning, education, agriculture, and environment; \$3.9 billion in food aid (1975 to 1990); and \$3.75 billion in cash transfers and technical assistance to facilitate policy reform and structural adjustment.

⁴ Dan Morgan, "House Votes Down Cut In Military Aid to Egypt," *Washington Post*, 16 July 2004, sec. A, p. 19; available from <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53864-2004Jul16.html>>; Internet; accessed 6 October, 2004. Current levels of aid to Egypt have come under increasing pressure in Congress and were subject of intense debate in recent budget deliberations. Passage required the intercession of the Secretary of State to sway legislators.

⁵ James K. Glassman, "Our 'Ally' Egypt," *Zogby International*, 24 September 2004; available from <<http://www.zogby.com/>>; Internet; accessed 29 September 2004. There has not been much goodwill generated by US generosity. The Mubarek regime, ruling under emergency powers for 23 years since the assassination of Sadat routinely utilizes it's media to demonize and cast blame on Israel and the US for it's egregious economic and civil rights performance.

⁶ James Zogby, "What Arabs Think, Values Beliefs and Concerns," *Zogby International*, September 2002; available from <<http://www.zogby.com/>>; Internet; accessed 28 September 2004.

⁷ Norvell B. DeAtkine, "The Arab Mind Revisited," *The Middle Eastern Forum* XI, no. 3, 2004; available from <<http://www.tharwaproject.com/English/Aff-Sec/MEF-MEQ/De%20Atkine.htm>>; Internet; accessed 18 March 2005.

⁸ Victor Billeh, "Educational Reform in the Arab Region," *Newsletter of the Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran & Turkey* 9, no. 2, Summer 2002; available from <[www.erf.org.eg/nletter/Newsletter_Sum02/ NewsletterSumlssue.Q30-32.pdf](http://www.erf.org.eg/nletter/Newsletter_Sum02/NewsletterSumlssue.Q30-32.pdf)>; Internet; accessed 15 December 2004.

⁹ Christian Bourge, "Educational Reform Critical In the Middle East," *United Press International*, 18 April 2004; available from <<http://www.upi.com/>>; Internet, accessed 26 September 2004.

¹⁰ William Albigh, *Modern Public Opinion* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1956).

¹¹ Rick Zednik, "Inside Al Jazeera," *Columbia Journalism Review*, March-April 2002; available from <<http://www.questia.com/>>; Internet; accessed 5 October 2004. Arab media during operation Iraqi Freedom gave complete access and great credibility to the Iraqi Information Minister and his pronouncements of great victories and heroic resistance. The stark images of Hussein's statue toppling in Baghdad and the other events which revealed the canard literally shocked the multitudes of Arabs and has had a seminal effect.

¹² Stephen Franklin, "Fear of Waking Up: The Arab Press Stirred During the War, But the Moment Passed," *Columbia Journalism Review*, September-October 2003; available from <<http://www.questia.com/>>; Internet; accessed 5 October 2004.

¹³ Richard C. Maddock and Richard Fulton, *Marketing to the Mind, Right Brain Strategies for Advertising and Marketing* (Westport, CT:Quorum Books, 1996), 17-23. Kowata and Buck (1995) illustrate the relationship between rationalizations and emotions (affect) in a cross-cultural study. According to these investigators, all products and services (including business-to-business) involve emotion. There are no choices in the marketplace that are unemotional. As we move from the left side to the right side of the product continuum illustrated below, affect remains stable as rational thinking becomes more important.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Report of Independent Task Force, Council for Foreign Relations, "Finding Americas Voice, A Strategy for Reinvigorating US Public Policy," 2003; available from <www.cfr.org/pdf/public_diplomacy.pdf>; Internet; accessed 27 December, 2004.

¹⁶ Justin Lewis, *Constructing Public Opinion: How Political Elites Do What They Like and Why We Seem to Go Along With It* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 99.

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